

Date of Hearing: July 2, 2024

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair

SB 981 (Wahab) – As Amended June 21, 2024

AS PROPOSED TO BE AMENDED

SENATE VOTE: 36-0

SUBJECT: Sexually explicit digital images

SYNOPSIS

“Imagine finding that someone has taken a picture of you from the internet and superimposed it on a sexually explicit image available online. Or that a video appears showing you having sex with someone you have never met.

“Imagine worrying that your children, partner, parents or colleagues might see this and believe it is really you. And that your frantic attempts to take it off social media keep failing, and the fake ‘you’ keeps reappearing and multiplying. Imagine realising that these images could remain online for ever and discovering that no laws exist to prosecute the people who created it.”¹

Consumer-facing, phone-based “nudification” applications enable the use of a person’s likeness to create highly-realistic pornographic imagery and videos, which with a click of a button can go viral among the person’s friends, family, employer, community, and beyond. Social media websites provide a potent means of amplifying deepfake nonconsensual pornography, extending the content’s reach by, in effect, crowdsourcing abuse—potentially reaching millions of viewers. The psychological trauma this can inflict on victims cannot be overstated.

This bill, as proposed to be amended, requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism for users of the platform to report “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing their intimate body parts. The bill would establish timeframes for the platform to respond, collect information, and make a determination—generally within 30 days—as to whether there is a reasonable basis that the reported content is sexually explicit digital identity theft. During this period, the platform must temporarily block the content. If the content is determined to be sexually explicit identity theft, the platform must permanently remove the content.

The bill is sponsored by Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón and supported by Snap, TechNet, and numerous law enforcement organizations. The Electronic Frontier Foundation opposes the bill, arguing that it runs afoul of the First Amendment and Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996.

¹ Kassova, Luba. “Tech bros need to realise deepfake porn ruins lives – and the law has to catch up,” *The Guardian* (Mar. 1, 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/01/tech-bros-nonconsensual-sexual-deepfakes-videos-porn-law-taylor-swift>.

Committee amendments align the bill's terminology with its scope by adding "sexually explicit" before "digital identity theft."

SUMMARY: Requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism for reporting "sexually explicit digital identity theft," as defined. Establishes timeframes for the platform to determine whether there is a reasonable basis that the reported content is sexually explicit digital identity theft. Requires the platform to temporarily block the content pending the determination and to permanently block it if the content is determined to be sexually explicit digital identity theft. Specifically, **this bill:**

- 1) Requires a social media platform to:
 - a) Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident and has an account with the platform to report "sexually explicit digital identity theft," defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person.
 - b) Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with confirmation of receipt within 48 hours and a written update as to the status of the platform's handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft within seven days of the issuance of the confirmation.
 - c) Determine within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the above-mentioned confirmation whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate. Allows for this period to be extended an extra 30 days if the platform cannot timely respond due to circumstances beyond its reasonable control, provided that notice of the delay is provided within 48 hours from the time the platform knew the delay was likely to occur.
 - d) Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending the determination described above.
 - e) Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from public view on the platform if it determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate.

EXISTING LAW:

- 1) Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Section 230).)

- 2) Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (47 U.S.C. § 230(e).)
- 3) Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Const., 1st amend; Cal. Const., art 1, § 2.)
- 4) Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets both of the following criteria:
 - a) A substantial function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow them to interact socially with each other within the service or application. (A service or application that provides email or direct messaging services does not meet this criterion based solely on that function.)
 - b) The service or application allows users to do all of the following:
 - i. Construct a public or semipublic profile for purposes of signing into and using the service or application.
 - ii. Populate a list of other users with whom an individual shares a social connection within the system.
 - iii. Create or post content viewable by other users, including on message boards, in chat rooms, or through a landing page or main feed that presents the user with content generated by other users. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22675(e).)
- 5) Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by AI which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact to the state of the proliferation of deepfakes. (Gov. Code § 11547.5.)
- 6) Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
 - c) Creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure.
 - d) Intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- 7) Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- 8) Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of

masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Pen. Code § 647(j)(4)(A).)

FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print, this bill is keyed nonfiscal.

COMMENTS:

1) **Author’s statement.** According to the author:

Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is digital identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for people to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.

It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.

Delays between a person reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.

We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through thoughtful and realistic requirements, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of unauthorized sexually explicit material.

2) **Sexually explicit digital identity theft.** This bill, as proposed to be amended, applies to “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” which is defined as an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person. This type of harm has been turbo-charged by the rapid development and widespread consumer availability of artificial intelligence (AI).

AI refers to the mimicking of human intelligence by artificial systems, such as computers. AI uses algorithms – sets of rules – to transform inputs into outputs. Inputs and outputs can be anything a computer can process: numbers, text, audio, video, or movement. AI that are trained on small, specific datasets in order to make recommendations and predictions are sometimes referred to as “predictive AI.” This differentiates them from GenAI, which are trained on massive datasets in order to produce detailed text and images. When Netflix suggests a TV show to a viewer, the recommendation is produced by predictive AI that has been trained on the viewing habits of Netflix users. When DALL-E generates high-resolution, lifelike images, it uses GenAI that has been trained on ~250 million text-image pairs.

The creation of text, imagery, video, and audio by GenAI has the potential to change the world by automating repetitive tasks and fostering creativity. When employed by bad actors, however, these capabilities have the potential to invade privacy and disrupt the lives of Californians. Since its inception, GenAI has been used to create nonconsensual pornography, more accurately referred to by sexual assault experts as image-based sexual abuse. According to a recent *New York Times* article, phone-based apps allowing teenage boys to digitally “nudify” their classmates have become increasingly accessible and affordable:

Boys in several states have used widely available “nudification” apps to pervert real, identifiable photos of their clothed female classmates, shown attending events like school proms, into graphic, convincing-looking images of the girls with exposed A.I.-generated breasts and genitalia. In some cases, boys shared the faked images in the school lunchroom, on the school bus or through group chats on platforms like Snapchat and Instagram, according to school and police reports.²

The harms of AI-powered image-based sexual abuse are already being felt in California:

A third school in Southern California has been hit with allegations of digitally manipulated images of students circulating around campus . . . “Sixteen eighth-grade students were identified as being victimized, as well as five egregiously involved eighth-grade students,” Superintendent Michael Bregy wrote. While Bregy acknowledged that children “are still learning and growing, and mistakes are part of the process,” he affirmed disciplinary measures had been taken and noted that the incident was swiftly contained. The district vowed to hold accountable any other students “found to be creating, disseminating, or in possession of AI-generated images of this nature.”³

Women are the primary targets of these efforts, and no one appears to be immune: in the run-up to the 2024 Super Bowl, a series of images involving Taylor Swift began to appear on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter). These images were removed over the following days, but the damage had been done:

“We are too little, too late at this point, but we can still try to mitigate the disaster that’s emerging,” says Mary Anne Franks, a professor at George Washington University Law School and president of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. Women are “canaries in the coal mine” when it comes to the abuse of artificial intelligence, she adds. “It’s not just going to be the 14-year-old girl or Taylor Swift. It’s going to be politicians. It’s going to be world leaders. It’s going to be elections.”⁴

The harm inflicted on women and girls by this technology cannot be overstated. In a recent *Guardian* article by gender equity expert and journalist, Luba Kassova, she argues that

² Natasha Singer, “Teen Girls Confront an Epidemic of Deepfake Nudes in Schools,” *New York Times*, Apr. 8, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/08/technology/deepfake-ai-nudes-westfield-high-school.html>.

³ Mackenzie Tatananni, “Inappropriate images’ circulate at yet another California high school, as officials grapple with how to protect teens from AI porn created by classmates,” *Daily Mail*, Apr. 11, 2024, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13295475/Inappropriate-images-California-Fairfax-High-School-AI-deepfake.html>.

⁴ Brian Contreras, “Tougher AI Policies Could Protect Taylor Swift—And Everyone Else—From Deepfakes,” Feb. 8, 2024, www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-ai-policies-could-protect-taylor-swift-and-everyone-else-from-deepfakes/.

“nonconsensual deepfake pornography has become a growing human rights crisis.” In her article she asks readers to:

Imagine finding that someone has taken a picture of you from the internet and superimposed it on a sexually explicit image available online. Or that a video appears showing you having sex with someone you have never met.

Imagine worrying that your children, partner, parents or colleagues might see this and believe it is really you. And that your frantic attempts to take it off social media keep failing, and the fake “you” keeps reappearing and multiplying. Imagine realising that these images could remain online for ever and discovering that no laws exist to prosecute the people who created it.⁵

The problem has become so pervasive that the United States Department of Justice recently launched the first the first national 24/7 helpline for survivors of image-based sexual abuse.⁶ According to RAINN, a non-profit anti-sexual assault organization, more than 100,000 deepfake images and videos are posted on the internet every day.⁷ The *2023 State of Deepfakes* report found in its survey of American men that 74 percent of deepfake pornography users did not feel guilty about their consumption. According to the report’s authors, this finding suggests that deepfake pornographic content is becoming normalized and accepted. Further, of those surveyed almost one-third of those surveyed stated that they did not think that deepfake pornography hurt anyone as long as it was only used for their personal interest.⁸

3) **What this bill does.** This bill, as proposed to be amended, requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident and has an account with the platform to report “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person.

Within 48 hours of receiving a report, platforms must confirm they received the report and commence collecting information to determine its veracity. Seven days after confirming receipt of the report, the platform must update reporting person. Within 30 days of confirming receipt, the platform must make a final determination as to whether the content is in fact sexually explicit digital identity theft.

Meantime, the platform must temporarily block the content. And if the content is determined to be sexually explicit identity theft, the platform must permanently remove it. Although the bill

5 Kassova, Luba. “Tech bros need to realise deepfake porn ruins lives – and the law has to catch up,” *The Guardian* (Mar. 1, 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/01/tech-bros-nonconsensual-sexual-deepfakes-videos-porn-law-taylor-swift>.

6 Travers, Karen and Emmanuelle Saliba. “Fake explicit Taylor Swift images: White House is ‘alarmed’,” *ABC News* (Jan. 26, 2024) <https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-house-calls-legislation-regulate-ai-amid-explicit/story?id=106718520>.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *2023 State of Deepfakes: Realities, Threats, and Impact*. Home Security Heroes. <https://www.homesecurityheroes.com/state-of-deepfakes/#deepfake-porn-survey>.

does not have an express enforcement mechanism, it is enforceable pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law.⁹

4) **Committee amendment.** The bill in print, although specific to deepfake nonconsensual pornography, applies more broadly to “digital identity theft.” To align the bill’s terminology with its scope, the author has agreed to amend the bill to apply to “sexually explicit digital identity theft.” The author has indicated an intent to revisit this issue next year in order continue expanding on these provisions.

5) **Constitutional considerations.** This bill is opposed by Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment and Section 230 of the federal Communications Act of 1996.

First Amendment. The United States and California Constitutions prohibit abridging, among other fundamental rights, freedom of speech.¹⁰ Citing no case law, EFF argues:

To begin, the definition of “covered material” is vague and ambiguous. The bill determines coverage using metrics that rely on the personal judgment of the individual depicted in the material. One is whether the reporter believes a “reasonable person” would find an image “intimate.” Another metric hinges on the reporter’s belief that the image or video will “appear to a reasonable person” to depict an “identifiable” person or body part of an “identifiable” person. What is “reasonable” is subjective; each reporter will have a unique interpretation based on their lived experience and the possibly disputed factual context around any particular image.

Combined with a reporting mechanism and the requirement to block and remove covered materials, S.B. 981 will lead to over-censorship of protected speech. The most recent amendments allow platforms up to 60 days to make a determination that the reported person is the depicted person. Despite the additional time to deliberate, it may still be difficult for a platform to determine whether a generated image would be “covered material.” Platforms, however, must temporarily block reported materials during review, and immediately remove materials determined to be covered. Because platforms must comply with the statute and are motivated to avoid liability for failures to comply, they will likely remove content with little review or investigation in response to this bill.

Content-based restrictions on protected speech,¹¹ including sexual speech that is not obscene,¹² are subject to “strict scrutiny” and thus are presumptively unconstitutional, valid only if the government proves they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.¹³

⁹ “The California unfair competition law (UCL) ([Bus. & Prof. Code,] § 17200 [et seq.]) defines ‘unfair competition’ as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’ Prevailing plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief and restitution, but the scope of the law is broad, ‘embracing “anything that [is] a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.”’ Even a practice not specifically proscribed by law may be deemed unfair under the statute, which ‘is written in the disjunctive, [and] establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’” (*Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407, internal citations and nested quotation marks omitted.)

¹⁰ U.S. Const., 1st and 14th Amends; Cal. Const. art. I, § 2.

¹¹ “Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” (*Reed v. Town of Gilbert* (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163.)

Preventing the severe psychological trauma that nonconsensual pornography transmitted via social media can inflict unquestionably serves a compelling governmental interest. The question, then, is whether the bill is narrowly tailored to further that interest. This bill applies to narrowly drawn categories of nonconsensual deepfake pornography on a specific medium—social media platforms—on which such imagery can easily go viral among the victim’s friends, family, employers, community, and beyond. In this regard, nearly every state, California included, has adopted “revenge pornography” statutes that vary widely in their elements, requirements, definitions and penalties. And yet “none of these statutes have ultimately been struck down as unconstitutional.”¹⁴ Given the similarity of the harms, there does not appear to be strong basis for expecting a different outcome for deepfake revenge pornography. That being said, to insulate the bill from challenge, the author may wish to explore ways of further narrowing it, including by expressly providing that the covered images must be highly realistic and life-like.

Section 230. Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”¹⁵ That section also provides a safe harbor for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”¹⁶ Finally, it provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”¹⁷

Through this statute, “Congress intended to create a blanket immunity from tort liability for online republication of third party content.”¹⁸ “The courts have consistently construed CDA Section 230 to eliminate all tort liability against websites, search engines, and other online intermediaries arising out of third-party postings on their services. The result is that large gatekeepers such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube have no duty to respond to takedown notices, even if the deplorable content is a continuing tort or crime.”¹⁹

According to EFF: “While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms,

¹² Sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment. (*Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC* (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126.) *Miller v. California* (1973) 414 U.S. 15 set forth the test for obscenity: “(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (*Id.* at p. 24 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) With regard to nonconsensual pornography, the Indiana Supreme Court in *State v. Katz* (Ind. 2022) 179 N.E.3d 431, 452 stated that “under the stringent test articulated by the Supreme Court in *Miller v. California*, this expressive activity is not ‘obscene.’”

¹³ *Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC* (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126.; *Ashcroft v. ACLU* (2004) 542 U.S. 656, 670; see *Reed v. Town of Gilbert* (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163; *United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group* (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 813.

¹⁴ *State v. Katz* (Ind. 2022) 179 N.E.3d 431, 450, citing, among other cases, *People v. Iniguez* (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1 (upholding California’s revenge pornography law).

¹⁵ 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

¹⁶ *Id.* at § 230(c)(2)(A)

¹⁷ *Id.* at (e)(3).

¹⁸ *Barrett v. Rosenthal* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 57.

¹⁹ *The Case for a CDA Section 230 Notice-and-Takedown Duty* (Spring, 2023) 23 Nev. L.J. 533, 536.

making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230's immunity: 'no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.'"

This argument has merit. As noted in the Senate Judiciary Committee's analysis of the bill, "the bill will likely face challenge as it exposes social media platforms to liability for failing to take down certain content posted by users. It also potentially exposes them to liability for failing to take reasonable steps to remove and block unreported instances posted by users." On the other hand, it is noteworthy that TechNet and Snap support the bill. This may be a reflection of the fact that some platforms have voluntarily implemented effective takedown regimes for such vile content. In support, Snap writes:

When someone shares intimate images of another person online without that person's consent, the effects can be devastating. These gross violations of privacy are a violation of Snapchat's Community Guidelines. At Snapchat, we are determined to put victims of NCII back in control of their most personal and private photos and videos. Accordingly, we encourage victims to: Report it to Snap in-app, via our Support Site, or via direct message on X (formerly Twitter); Snap's Trust & Safety teams will review your report and take action. Users can also contact StopNCII, a non-profit dedicated to stopping the online spread of NCII. StopNCII offers victims of NCII the opportunity to create a unique digital signature, called a "hash," of their image(s). These hashes are then made available to participating tech companies, including Snapchat. We search for matches to the hashes and delete any violating content from Snapchat.

Snapchat employs moderation tools for our public content features such as Spotlight, Stories, and the Map to reduce the chances of obscene material being distributed. Content and accounts can also be flagged via in-app reporting – including private snaps and chat. These reports are reviewed and acted upon quickly by our dedicated safety teams.

SB 981 represents a necessary step in ensuring our collective efforts to protect users' well-being are reinforced by smart policy. It is imperative that industry, law enforcement, and the legislature stand in lock-step to root out violative material and bad actors, and ensure platforms are safe for all users.

6) **Related legislation.** SB 646 (Cortese, 2023) creates liability for the distribution of certain "actionable material," which includes illicit pictures of minors and images or depictions of minors that serve as the basis for criminal and civil liability at the federal level. The bill was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón, the bill's sponsor, writes:

While deepfakes have received enormous attention for their potential political dangers, the vast majority of deepfakes are used to target women. Sensity AI, a research company that has tracked online deepfake videos since December of 2018, has consistently found that between 90% and 95% of the deepfakes online are nonconsensual porn and that about 90% is nonconsensual porn of women. The harm caused to victims of this type of criminal activity is real. These victims are at risk for both short and long-term negative outcomes due to the trauma, fear, instability, interrupted attachment relationships, grief, and subsequent emotions that arise after this type of victimization.

The harms this type of victimization causes are well documented and include but are not limited to PTSD, chronic health problems, mental illness, and substance abuse. They can also negatively impact educational attainment, job opportunities, and earning potential.

Many of these victims begin to doubt everyone they come into contact with. Others have had to change their names or completely remove themselves from the internet. They constantly fear being retraumatized, because at any moment the images could resurface and once again ruin their lives. In the most severe cases victims have committed suicide after becoming a victim of this type of illicit behavior.

Many DV advocates believe the increase in this type of deepfake victimization is particularly concerning and alarming because it is a perfect tool for someone seeking to exert power and control over a victim.

Unfortunately, there are only a smattering of existing civil and criminal laws to protect these victims leaving no legal remedies for the vast majority of cases.

Even when a criminal prosecution can be filed, it takes months and sometimes over a year before a case can be adjudicated. For this reason, it is crucial that legislation like SB 981 be enacted to protect innocent victims.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: See Comment 5.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (sponsor)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of San Jose
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Monterey County
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Novato Police Officers Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
PERK Advocacy
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association

Santa Ana Police Officers Association
SNAP INC.
Technet-technology Network
Upland Police Officers Association

Opposition

Electronic Frontier Foundation

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