

Date of Hearing: April 7, 2026

Fiscal: Yes

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair

AB 2624 (Bonta) – As Amended March 26, 2026

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

SUBJECT: Privacy for immigration support services providers

SYNOPSIS

California’s recent history has been one of inclusion, respect, and sanctuary for our immigrant communities. While Congress has failed to pass comprehensive immigration reform over the last decade, California has exercised its state power to protect immigrants who are caught in limbo due to Washington’s inaction. The Legislature continues to act year after year by passing significant legislation to both protect people from harm who have immigrated to California and to provide them with many of the supports and services provided to all California residents.

Unfortunately, with the current federal administration’s stated goal of removing immigrants, regardless of whether or not they are in the country without the appropriate paperwork, coupled with the President’s directive to focus efforts on sanctuary states and cities, the need to protect Californians regardless of their country of origin, ethnicity, or immigration status has become even more critical if California is to remain a state that is committed to providing sanctuary. Importantly, to continue to provide the support services that immigrant communities need, the people providing those services find that they, too, need to be protected from increasingly violent, xenophobic actions by those seeking to rid the country of non-white immigrants.¹

This bill expands the Secretary of State’s Safe at Home program to allow designated immigration support services providers, employees, and volunteers who have experienced harm or threats of violence because of their work with immigrants to register allowing them to keep their addresses out of public records. The Committee amendments enumerated in Comment #8 are clarifying in nature. The amendments remove references to “social media” and instead prohibit the posting of protected information on the internet.

The bill is co-sponsored by Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) and the Women’s Foundation California, Solis Policy Institute. It enjoys the support of a number of social justice organizations and has no registered opposition.

This bill has been triple referred. If passed by this Committee, this bill will next be heard by the Judiciary Committee and then the Public Safety Committee.

¹ In February 2025, the President signed an executive order offering refugee status to white Afrikaners living in South Africa, while at the same time cancelling refugee status for people from most non-white countries. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/addressing-egregious-actions-of-the-republic-of-south-africa/>.

EXISTING LAW:

- 1) Establishes the Safe at Home (SAH) address confidentiality program within the office of the Secretary of State (SOS) in order to enable state and local agencies to both accept and respond to requests for public records without disclosing the changed name or address of a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, child abduction, or elder or dependent adult abuse. Permits any such adult victim, or parent or guardian acting on behalf of a minor or incapacitated person, to apply through a community-based victims' assistance program to have an address designated by the SOS as their substitute mailing address. (Gov. Code § 6205 *et seq.*)
- 2) Makes legislative findings that persons attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, child abduction, or elder or dependent adult abuse frequently establish new names or addresses to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding them. The purpose of this chapter is to enable state and local agencies to respond to requests for public records without disclosing the changed name or location of a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, child abduction, or elder or dependent adult abuse to enable interagency cooperation with the Secretary of State in providing name and address confidentiality for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, child abduction, or elder or dependent adult abuse and to enable state and local agencies to accept a program participant's use of an address designated by the Secretary of State as a substitute mailing address. (Gov Code § 6205.)
- 3) Allows reproductive health care and gender affirming care providers, employees, volunteers, and patients to apply to the SAH address confidentiality program through a community-based victims' assistance program, as specified. (Gov.Code §§ 6215 *et seq.*)
- 4) Requires an applicant, as part of their application, to provide the following to qualify for the health care provider address confidentiality program:
 - a. Documentation showing that the individual is to commence employment or is currently employed as a provider or employee at a designated health care services facility or is volunteering at a designated health care services facility.
 - b. A certified statement signed by a person authorized by the designated health care services facility stating that the facility or any of its providers, employees, volunteers, or patients is or was the target of threats or acts of violence within one year of the date of the application; and provides that a person who willfully certifies as true any material matter pursuant to this section which he or she knows to be false is guilty of a misdemeanor.
 - c. A sworn statement that the applicant fears for their safety or the safety of their family, or the safety of the minor or incapacitated person on whose behalf the application is made due to their affiliation with the designated health care services facility providing the declaration described in 4b). (Gov. Code § 6215.2 (a)(1).)
- 5) Provides that if the applicant alleges that the basis for the application is that the applicant is a designated health care services facility volunteer, the application shall, in addition to the documents specified above, be accompanied by designated health care services facility

documentation showing the length of time the volunteer has committed to working at the facility. (Gov. Code § 6215.2 (a)(2).)

- 6) Requires that the SOS certify a successful applicant as a program participant for four years following the date of filing, unless the certification is withdrawn or invalidated before that date, except designated health care services facilities volunteers shall be certified until six months from the last date of volunteering with the facility. Provides that the SOS shall establish a renewal procedure. (Gov. Code §§ 6206 (c), 6215.2 (e).)
- 7) Allows a participant to withdraw from the Safe at Home program. Provides the SOS with the authority to cancel a program participant's certification for specified reasons. (Gov Code §§ 6206.5, 6206.7, 6215.3, 6215.4.)
- 8) Provides that a person, business, or association shall not solicit, sell, or trade on the internet or social media the personal information or image of a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant with the intent to do either of the following:
 - a. Incite a third person to cause imminent great bodily harm to the person identified in the posting or display, or to a coresident of that person, where the third person is likely to commit this harm.
 - b. Threaten the person identified in the posting or display, or a coresident of that person, in a manner that places the person identified or the coresident in objectively reasonable fear for their personal safety. (Gov. Code § 6218(a)(1).)
- 9) Allows a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant whose personal information or image is solicited, sold, or traded in violation of 8), or any individual, entity, or organization authorized to act on their behalf, to bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. In addition to any other legal rights and remedies, if a jury or court finds that a violation has occurred, it shall award damages to that individual in an amount up to a maximum of three times the actual damages, but in no case less than four thousand dollars (\$4,000). (Gov. Code § 6218(a)(2).)
- 10) Provides that a person, business, or association shall not publicly post or publicly display, disclose, or distribute, on internet websites or social media, the personal information or image of a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant if that individual, or any individual, entity, or organization authorized to act on their behalf, has made a written demand of that person, business, or association to not disclose the personal information or image. (Gov. Code § 6218(b)(1).)
 - a. Requires that a written demand shall include a statement declaring that the individual is subject to the protection of this section and describing a reasonable fear for the safety of that individual or of any person residing at the individual's home address.
 - b. Specifies that a demand shall be effective for four years, regardless of whether the individual's affiliation with a designated health care services facility has expired prior to the end of the four-year period.
 - c. Provides that a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant whose personal information or image is made public as a result of a failure to honor a

- demand, or any individual, entity, or organization authorized to act on their behalf, may bring an action seeking injunctive or declarative relief in any court of competent jurisdiction. If a jury or court finds that a violation has occurred, it may grant injunctive or declarative relief and shall award the successful plaintiff court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. (Gov. Code § 6218 (b)(2).)
- d. Clarifies that 9) does not apply to a person or entity defined in Section 1070 of the Evidence Code (a publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, etc.) (Gov. Code § 6218 (b)(3).)
 - e. Clarifies that an interactive computer service or access software provider (which is exempt from liability for third party content under Section 230(f) of Title 47 of the United States Code), shall not be liable under this section unless the service or provider intends to abet or cause bodily harm that is likely to occur or threatens to cause bodily harm to a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant, or any person residing at the same home address. (Gov Code § 6218 (d).)
- 11) Prohibits a person from posting on the internet or social media, with the intent that another person imminently use that information to commit a crime involving violence or a threat of violence against a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant, or other individuals residing at the same home address, the personal information or image of a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant, or other individuals residing at the same home address. (Gov. Code § 6218.01 (a)(1).)
- a. Provides that the above is punishable by a fine of up to \$10,000 per violation, imprisonment of either up to one year in a county jail or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Gov Code § 6218.01(a)(2).)
 - b. Provides that a violation of the above that leads to the bodily injury of a designated health care services patient, provider, or assistant, or other individuals residing at the same home address, is a felony punishable by a fine of up to \$50,000, imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Gov Code § 6218.01(a)(2).)
- 12) Prohibits law enforcement agencies from using agency or department money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, as specified, place peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies, use immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters, transfer an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant, provide office space exclusively dedicated to immigration authorities, and contract with the federal government for the use of law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for the purposes of civil immigration custody, as specified. (Gov. Code § 7284.6.)
- 13) Required the Attorney General, by October 1, 2018, working in consultation with appropriate stakeholders, to publish guidance, audit criteria, and training recommendations aimed at ensuring that any databases operated by state and local law enforcement agencies, including databases maintained for the agency by private vendors, are governed in a manner that limits

the availability of information therein to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement, to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with federal and state law. (Gov. Code § 7284.8(b).)

- 14) Prohibits, except as otherwise required by federal law, an employer or person acting on their behalf from providing voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter any nonpublic area of a place of labor, unless the agent provides a judicial warrant, and specifies civil penalties for an employer who violates this prohibition. (Gov. Code § 7285.1.)
- 15) Prohibits an employer from providing voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to access, review, or obtain the employer's employee records without a subpoena or judicial warrant, except for access to I-9 employment eligibility verification forms or other documents for which a Notice of Inspection has been provided to the employer. Provides a civil penalty, enforceable by the Labor Commissioner or the Attorney General, for a violation of this prohibition. (Gov. Code § 7285.2.)

THIS BILL:

- 1) Creates a new Safe at Home program administered by the Secretary of State for immigration support services providers, employees, and volunteers who are in fear of their safety. The new program contains the same general provisions and requirements that currently apply to providers, employees, volunteers, and patients of reproductive health care and gender-affirming health care service providers.
- 2) Defines the following terms:
 - a. "Designated immigration support services" means services provided to the immigrant population, including, but not limited to, legal representation, legal assistance, advocacy, case management, humanitarian relief, immigration resources, referrals, translation services, counseling services, and health care.
 - b. "Designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer" means a person who provides, assists in providing, or receives immigration support services at a designated immigration support services facility.
 - c. "Designated immigration support services facility" means a facility where immigration support services are provided, including, but not limited to, nonprofit organizations offices, Department of Justice-recognized entities, community legal clinics, law offices, accredited representative sites that provide immigration legal services, and health care facilities.
- 3) Expands the existing prohibition that a person, business, or association not publicly post or publicly display, disclose, or distribute, on websites or social media, the personal information or image of program participants to apply to a designated immigration support services providers, employees, and volunteers.
- 4) Requires the Secretary of State to cancel the certification of a program participant who fails to disclose a change in employment status, or termination as a provider or volunteer.
- 5) Requires the Secretary of State to begin accepting applications on April 1, 2027.

COMMENTS:**1) Author's statement.** According to the author:

AB 2624 strengthens protections for individuals working in immigrant service roles, including nonprofit staff, volunteers, and legal services providers, who may face risks such as doxxing, harassment, or threats due to the nature of their work. By extending Safe at Home Program protections, the bill allows eligible participants to keep their personal information confidential in public records, helping reduce exposure to harm while supporting the continued delivery of legal, social, and humanitarian services. This proposal promotes safety, privacy, and continuity of essential services, reinforcing public confidence and ensuring that those serving communities across California can carry out their responsibilities effectively and securely.

2) The Safe at Home Program. The Secretary of State's (SOS) Safe at Home (SAH) program was created in 1998 to allow victims of domestic violence or stalking to obtain an alternate confidential address to be used in public records. Under the SAH program, the SOS is responsible for providing a substitute address to program participants while protecting their actual residential addresses and acts as the participants' agent for service of process, and forwards mail received at the substitute address. A participant must be certified by the enrolling office and may stay in the program for four years unless recertified. Their SAH address is also accepted by California state, county, and city government agencies in lieu of a residential or other mailing address.

The SAH address confidentiality program has been expanded over time to include survivors of other crimes – including sexual assault, human trafficking, stalking, child abduction, and elder or dependent adult abuse. In 2002, the SAH program was replicated and made available to reproductive health care providers, employees, volunteers and patients who are fearful of their safety. In 2022, the program for reproductive service providers, employees, volunteers and patients was expanded to include a person who is employed by or performs work pursuant to a contract with a public entity and faces threats of violence or harassment from the public because of their work for the public entity. In 2025, the program was expanded again to include gender affirming care providers, employees, volunteers, and patients.

This bill proposes to once again expand the program to include immigration support services providers, employees, and volunteers who would be afforded all the same protections as people providing reproductive care and gender affirming care.

3) California is a sanctuary state. California leads the nation with pro-immigrant policies that have sparked change nationwide, including expanding access to higher education, expanding access to health care and public benefits, advancing protections for immigrant workers, supporting immigrant students through partnerships with school districts, and improving opportunities for economic mobility and inclusion through access to driver's licenses and pro bono immigration services.

Senate Bill 54, the California Values Act, which took effect on January 1, 2018, is considered the most comprehensive state protection for undocumented immigrants. The law builds on previous "sanctuary" policies regarding assisting federal immigration efforts—and extends them—by establishing statewide non-cooperative policies between state law enforcement agencies and federal immigration authorities.

In addition to prohibiting law enforcement agencies from assisting with immigration enforcement efforts, state law prohibits an employer from voluntarily granting access to non-public spaces. Employers are also prohibited from voluntarily consenting to providing immigration enforcement agents access to employee records, absent a subpoena.

This bill furthers the state's goals to provide a place of sanctuary for the immigrant population by helping to ensure that those who are providing critical services to that population are free from threats, physical harm, and harassment.

4) **The federal administration's immigration policy.** On the day of his inauguration, the current President signed an executive order declaring a national emergency at the southern border. This allows the administration to send military troops to patrol the border. In addition to increasing patrols at the southern border, the President has also called for "mass deportation," restrictions on asylum access, an "America First" trade policy, and an end to birth-right citizenship that is protected under the 14th Amendment.² All policies that were outlined in the document that is proving to be a blueprint for this administration, Project 2025.³

Project 2025 contains 33 separate policies related to immigration. Among them are:

- Authorizing state and local law enforcement to participate in immigration actions.
- Creating a detention standard that includes the "flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents."
- Increasing the use of civil search warrants for workplace raids.
- Deploying active-duty personnel and National Guardsmen to the border.
- Suspending all visas to people from countries that do not accept the return of immigrants ordered deported.
- Limiting Federal Emergency Management Assistance (FEMA)-issued grants to states that "comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainees".
- Ending birthright citizenship.

As of this date, 12 of the 33 policy changes are in progress and 15 have been completed.⁴

During his campaign, the President pledged to initiate "the largest domestic deportation operation in American history."⁵ In order to achieve that objective, the President has pledged to

² *A Guide to Immigration Policy Changes in 2025*, Bloomberg Government (May 30, 2025)

<https://about.bgov.com/insights/federal-policy/a-guide-to-immigration-policy-changes-in-2025/#current>.

³ Released in 2023, Project 2025 is an extensive set of plans by the Heritage Foundation designed to provide a roadmap for "the next conservative President" to downsize the federal government and fundamentally change how it works, including the tax system, immigration enforcement, social welfare programs and energy policy, particularly those designed to address climate change. In addition, it contains policies for "traditional family values." A 900 page summary, *Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise*, of the 20-volume, 3,000 page "governing handbook" is available at <https://www.mandateforleadership.org/>.

⁴ Project 2025 Tracker <https://www.project2025.observer/>.

⁵ Maria Ramirez Uribe. "Trump promised mass deportations. Where does that stand six months into his administration?" *PolitiFact* (July 24, 2025). <https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/maga-meter-tracking-donald-trumps-2024-promises/promise/1617/carry-out-the-largest-domestic-deportation-operati/article/3213/>.

deport over 12 million people during the first two years of his presidency.⁶ In undertaking that goal and implementing the immigration blueprint in Project 2025, over 68,289 people have been placed in ICE detention facilities and of those over 50,250 have no criminal record.⁷ In addition, immigration court judges have ordered over 260,000 people be deported in the first five months of the current federal fiscal year.⁸ Mainstream media has reported daily about incidents of people being arrested, beaten, and killed on the street, in their workplaces, in their homes, in schools, and in places of worship by men with their faces covered and no identification who claim to be agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

5) Escalating tensions toward immigrant populations and those who work with them.

According to the author, individuals who support immigrant populations, including public-facing service workers who face heightened risks because of their roles.

In 2025, following a series of immigration raids, there has been a surge in misinformation and harmful rhetoric disseminated by right-wing media outlets and some elected officials. This has contributed to the spread of false and damaging content on social media, often targeting organizations and individuals working in immigrant services. In one instance, an organization had sensitive personal information about its senior staff publicly posted online. Additionally, staff members at various levels have reported being followed when arriving at or leaving their workplaces.

At the same time, current federal policies and rhetoric have created a climate of fear and uncertainty across many immigrant communities. In this environment, immigrant-serving organizations are indispensable. They amplify immigrant voices, help individuals understand and exercise their constitutional rights, guide families through complex legal systems, and provide essential resources such as food assistance and educational support.

Integrating these protections into the Safe at Home Program would reduce the public exposure of sensitive personal information, deter malicious online behavior, and provide meaningful legal tools to prevent and address doxxing before it escalates into physical harm. Ultimately, this bill will enable immigrant-serving organizations to carry out their work safely.

From a more specific perspective, the TransLatina Resource Center (TLRC) in San Francisco provides essential services to immigrant communities, including legal assistance for asylum cases. The organization has faced ongoing threats to data privacy, personal safety, and operational security due to coordinated doxxing efforts. As a result, TLRC has spent approximately \$10,000 on data protection services, hired front-door security during business hours, and removed employee information and its address from its website—actions that have also made it more difficult for clients to access services. Attorneys at TLRC face the risk of having their personal information weaponized each time they file a case. Expanding access to the Safe at Home Program would provide critical privacy protections, allowing them to continue their work without compromising their safety. These protections are

⁶ Danny Nguyen, “Erik Prince: Government needs private sector help for deportations” *Politico* (Feb. 26, 2025) <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/26/trump-deportations-private-sector-00002679>,

⁷ Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Detention Quick Facts. <https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/detention.html>

⁸ *Ibid.*

essential not only for service providers, but also for the communities that depend on them. At its core, this issue is about ensuring that people can both provide and access vital immigration services without fear for their personal or family safety.

6) **Mass surveillance and data brokers.** The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence over the past five years has significantly accelerated data collection and processing. AI agents can be deployed to extract data, also known as scraping, from websites by crawling throughout the internet. Inevitably this includes thousands of bits of disparate data about consumers which brokers compile using these same AI tools and sell to businesses. These businesses can then quickly integrate the acquired data with their own consumer information to create detailed consumer profiles. With AI, these profiles can be updated in real time to personalize user experiences and target advertisements more effectively.

In addition to gathering data in the online world, in the physical world we cannot step out of our homes without being monitored and tracked. Cars collect location data everywhere we drive. Phones, our constant companions, collect location data everywhere we go. License plate readers and traffic cameras are at virtually every intersection, on freeways and toll roads, at the entrance of parking garages, and in store parking lots. These devices track the movement of every single car that passes by. Even if someone walks or rides a bicycle, security cameras on homes and business can capture their movements and their location. Our faces may not be captured by these cameras, but technological advancements can analyze a person's walk and movements using gait recognition technology in an attempt to identify them.⁹ In addition, most stores and businesses use security cameras and images from those cameras can easily be run through facial recognition systems to identify the people walking through their doors. It has become virtually impossible for people to move through their day without being watched.

Data brokers then purchase that purchase data from multiple sources, combine this information to create comprehensive datasets about us and our lives, and offer this information for sale to anyone able to pay for it. Perhaps more importantly, they are in the business of gathering all the data they can on individuals and creating extensive dossiers that can then be used to make startling and category-jumping inferences, including those that reveal attributes or conditions an individual has specifically withheld from others.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines data brokers as “companies whose primary business is collecting personal information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or information derived from it, for purposes such as marketing products, verifying an individual's identity, or detecting fraud.”¹⁰

California's Data Broker Registration Law defines “data broker” as “a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.”¹¹

⁹ *Gait recognition system: deep dive into this future tech*, recfaces.com blog post, <https://recfaces.com/articles/what-is-gait-recognition>

¹⁰ FTC, *Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability* (May 2014) p. 3, <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf>.

¹¹ Civ. Code § 1798.99.80(d).

The common point in both of these definitions is that there is no direct relationship between an individual and any data broker that has information about them. Virtually no one chooses to have a relationship with a data broker. There is certainly a consensual transaction between the individual and the websites they access, the apps they use, and their cell phone and internet service providers. Each of these transactions involves a transfer of an individual's personal information to these entities. But the person is not involved in the subsequent sale or transfer of their information to data brokers; there is no transaction between the consumer and the data broker involved with that sale or transfer.

In large part as a result of this business model and our surveillance economy, Californians face a greater loss of privacy than at any other time, with not only governments' ability to monitor individual's private lives, but also the near ubiquitous access to these dossiers afforded to private businesses and individuals willing to pay for them. There are more than 4,000 data brokers with dossiers on 98% of the people in the United States.¹² The largest data broker, Acxiom, has more than 10,000 data attributes on over 2.5 billion people in more than 60 countries.¹³

7) **Analysis.** The question for this committee is whether this bill protects the privacy of people working with immigrant communities who are facing threats and harassment. In an era of mass private and government surveillance, finding a person's home, school or business address, along with those of their friends and family members, often takes less than a minute and can be accomplished by visiting a free "people finder" website. However, adding them to the SAH program does provide a major layer of protection when it comes to publicly available government records. Unfortunately, with the rise of surveillance capitalism, data brokers, and artificial intelligence (AI) over the last decade, fully ensuring one's privacy, including home address, location, and family members has become more difficult.

This level of surveillance brings with it a myriad of risks. It creates dossiers that can easily reveal a person's reproductive health needs and choices, a person's gender and whether they are seeking gender affirming care, and a person's country of origin and immigration status. In the current political environment, these dossiers can potentially be deployed by malicious actors intent on harming the very individuals the Legislature has sought to protect through the SAH program.

As a result, even if someone has successfully protected their address through the SAH address confidentiality program, they will likely need to take additional affirmative steps to protect themselves, including scrubbing their social media presence, paying a company to monitor and delete any personal information that shows up on the internet, exercising their opt-out rights when it comes to the sharing of their personal information by companies, and registering with the California Privacy Protection Agency's Delete Request and Opt-out Platform that sends their delete requests to all data brokers registered in the state of California.¹⁴ Pending legislation, such

¹² Solove, Daniel J. *Privacy in Authoritarian Times: Surveillance Capitalism and Government Surveillance*, George Washington University Law School (Jan. 19, 2025). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5103271.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The Delete Act, passed in 2023, required the California Privacy Protection Agency to develop a streamlined process that allows consumers to submit a request that every data broker that maintains any personal information delete the information related to that consumer held by the data broker. That ability for consumers to submit requests became active January 1 of this year. The Privacy Agency is then required to provide the requests to all registered data brokers. The Delete Act requires data brokers to honor those requests starting August 1, 2026. Once a data

as AB 1542 (Ward), which restricts the collection and sharing of sensitive personal information, including immigration status, would augment such protections. Going forward, the author may wish to consider whether additional steps to fully protect individuals in the SAH program from private surveillance are warranted, including provisions that would facilitate assistance to individuals in exercising their rights as described above.

8) **Amendments.** The author has agreed to the following clarifying amendments:

As currently drafted, this bill includes an overly broad definition of “social media” that is unnecessary. The author’s intent is to prohibit the posting and sharing of personal information on the internet generally, not just social media platforms. The proposed committee amendments are the following:

6218.11. ~~(k) “Social media” means an electronic service or account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos or still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or internet website profiles or locations.~~

6218.19. (a) (1) A person, business, or association shall not knowingly publicly post or publicly display, disclose, or distribute on *the* internet ~~websites or social media~~, the personal information or image of any designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer, or other individuals residing at the same home address, with the intent to do either of the following:

(b) (1) A person, business, or association shall not publicly post or publicly display, disclose, or distribute, on *the* internet ~~websites or social media~~, the personal information or image of a designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer if that individual, or any individual, entity, or organization authorized to act on their behalf, has made a written demand of that person, business, or association to not disclose the personal information or image. A written demand made under this paragraph shall include a statement declaring that the individual is subject to the protection of this section and describing a reasonable fear for the safety of that individual or of any person residing at the individual’s home address, based on a violation of subdivision (a). A demand made under this paragraph shall be effective for four years, regardless of whether or not the individual’s affiliation with a designated immigration support services facility has expired prior to the end of the four-year period.

(c) (1) A person, business, or association shall not solicit, sell, or trade on *the* internet ~~websites or social media~~, the personal information or image of a designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer with the intent to do either of the following:

6218.20. (a) (1) A person shall not post on *the* internet ~~websites or social media~~, with the intent that another person imminently use that information to commit a crime involving violence or a threat of violence against a designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer, or other individuals residing at the same home address, the personal

information or image of a designated immigration support services provider, employee, or volunteer, or other individuals residing at the same home address.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Women’s Foundation California, Solis Policy Institute, co-sponsors of the bill, write in support:

AB 2624 is a critical measure that advances California’s commitments to privacy, the fair administration of justice, and public safety by protecting immigration support service providers and the individuals they serve. By safeguarding sensitive personal information—such as home addresses—the bill reduces the risk of harassment, intimidation, and targeted harm, while preventing the misuse of data against vulnerable communities. These protections reinforce core legal principles of privacy and due process, ensure equitable access to essential services, and promote community trust in institutions. In doing so, AB 2624 helps prevent escalation into violence, strengthens community stability, and supports safer, more secure communities across California.

Co-sponsors, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) also note:

Immigrant support providers, whether working in legal assistance, advocacy, education or community support, are operating under heightened risk in the current political climate. Many have experienced harassment, threats, doxxing, and targeted intimidation due to their work. These incidents have escalated significantly in recent years and are likely to continue given the current climate surrounding immigration policy. Such threats jeopardize the safety of advocates and staff and disrupt the vital services they provide to immigrant communities. Advocates and staff should not have to fear that sensitive personal information, such as their home addresses, can be weaponized against them by anti-immigrant vigilantes.

Currently, the law does not offer these individuals the same confidentiality protection that exists for other groups under the Safe at Home Program, leaving them at risk of danger. AB 2624 addresses this gap by allowing those serving immigrant populations to access the critical privacy safeguards, helping them work without fear for their safety. The Safe at Home Program has a long history of protecting people in vulnerable situations. Originally designed for survivors of domestic violence, it has been expanded over the years to include victims of stalking, reproductive health workers, and gender-affirming health care providers. AB 2624 extends these protections to the immigration services sector, ensuring that personal information remains confidential and that threats of harassment can be legally addressed under existing civil and criminal frameworks.

The expansion of these protections strengthens the broader support ecosystem, preserving the integrity and continuity of services offered by immigrant support organizations. By shielding staff and volunteers from exposure to online harassment and physical threats, AB 2624 allows organizations to continue providing legal guidance, advocacy, and community resources safely and effectively. Protecting those who serve immigrants ultimately helps immigrant communities live with dignity and access the support they need in California.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) (Co-Sponsor)
Women's Foundation California, Solis Policy Institute (Co-Sponsor)
Access Reproductive Justice
Asian Americans Advancing Justice-southern California
Cair California
California Association of Nonprofits
California Domestic Workers Coalition
California Initiative for Technology & Democracy, a Project of California Common CAUSE
Cft – a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, Aft, Afl-cio
Courage California
Equal Rights Advocates
Grace Institute - End Child Poverty in CA
Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice
Latino Coalition for a Healthy California
Power California Action
San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center
Todec Legal Center
Unidosus
Vision Y Compromiso (UNREG)

Opposition

None on file.

Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200